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Spatialising political settlements 
Jonathan Goodhand and Patrick Meehan 
 
In recent years, political settlements analysis (PSA)i has helped development agencies 
advance their understanding of the relationship between stability, conflict, development and 
political change.ii It focuses attention on the distribution of power in society, exploring how 
power shapes formal and informal institutional arrangements, the distribution of resources 
(political, economic and social), and the legitimacy of these arrangements. Political 
settlements are not consciously engineered but are the product of historical bargaining 
processes between elites, and reflect the prevailing power within society at a given point in 
time. 
 
PSA challenges development actors to move beyond a technical focus on designing the 
‘right’ interventions, emphasising that any intervention will be shaped by power relations and 
political interests and thus, must be resilient to these pressures. It also warns that policy 
interventions and programmes will be ineffective or, worse, cause harm, if they ignore the 
interests of powerful elites. In doing so, PSA provides an important corrective to liberal 
peacebuilding models, which view the signing of peace agreements and the creation of 
formal institutions as the key determinate of post-war transitions. In contrast, PSA 
demonstrates the importance of focusing on the (mis)alignment between formal peace 
processes and underlying configurations of power, and warns that in contexts where formal 
peace negotiations do not reflect the underlying balance of power, there is likely to be 
renewed violence.  
 
Development agencies increasingly use this type of analysis to ask whether certain types of 
post-war political settlement can lead to more or less progressive outcomes over time. Much 
attention has been paid to levels of inclusivity (both ‘horizontal inclusion’ between different 
elites, and ‘vertical inclusion’ between elites and the wider population) in post-war political 
settlements, as well as the trade-offs between stability and elite buy-in, and more 
‘progressive’ and socially inclusive settlements. The elite bargains needed to stabilise violent 
conflict may create problematic legacies, allowing elites to ‘capture’ the benefits of peace, 
providing little scope for sustained progressive change. However, efforts to push for more 
transformative social and political change in highly fragile contexts have also generated 
further instability where such reforms represent a threat to the interests of powerful elites. 
 
In spite of these important insights, PSA lacks an explicit analysis of space and territory, 
which limits its value in relation to borderlands. In this article we set out a more spatially 
sensitive analytical framework for understanding political settlements and post-war 
transitions. We first explore the limitations of PSA, and then highlight how an extension of 
the framework to incorporate an explicit focus on borderland dynamics can provide insights 
that can strengthen understanding of and responses to subnational and transnational violent 
conflict.  
Political settlements analysis: a spatial critique 
The most fundamental limitation of PSA is the fact that it takes the nation state as its sole 
frame of reference. The underlying conceptual framework is one of elites bargaining at a 
national level within a territorially defined state. This reinforces the statist approach adopted 
by development agencies, and is reflected in the way that the development industry 
organises itself: including the division of the world into country teams, national planning and 
budgeting processes, statistics aggregated at the national level and the location of country 
offices in capital cities – all of which limit understandings of borderland dynamics.  
This nation-state framework of analysis is problematic for three reasons:  
Firstly, it underplays international and regional dimensions of political settlements. Domestic 
elites’ strategies to secure their interests are often oriented outwards, particularly in regional 
conflict systems in which violence, networks and flows (of weapons, goods and people) 
operate across borders. The political survival of national elites in such circumstances 
depends upon capturing transnational resources, building alliances with external patrons and 
mobilising cross-border political or religious networks. Domestic political settlements are thus 
often heavily shaped by neighbouring states. Myanmar’s political settlement, for example, is 
deeply influenced by the country’s relationship with China, while in East Africa the domestic 
political settlements within Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia are all interconnected. Power 
dynamics do not fit within the ‘container’ of the state but are intimately shaped by 
transnational power structures, networks and flows.  
Secondly, PSA underestimates the importance of subnational bargaining processes. These 
often differ significantly from those at the centre but play a key role in shaping national-level 
political settlements. Greater understanding is needed of the specific challenges that 
borderlands pose to ruling elites, including: histories of weak state control and contested 
legitimacy of state authority; and the challenges of co-opting borderland elites into national 
coalitions when the availability of cross-border sources of weapons, revenue and support 
give borderland elites significant power and disruptive potential. In this sense, border regions 
can be understood as ‘special political zones’ that frequently occupy a disproportionate 
amount of the attention of ruling elites and where repeated challenges to the overarching 
political settlement are likely to arise. PSA does not provide clear entry points for engaging 
with conflicts where relatively stable political settlements at the national level co-exist with 
high levels of subnational borderland violence.  
 
Thirdly, PSA is rarely attuned to the significance of shifting centre–periphery relations in 
post-war transitions. It assumes that once order is established at the centre, this will provide 
the foundations for peace throughout a country’s territory. In other words, political order 
radiates outwards from the centre into unruly peripheries. However, many conflicts emerging 
from the state’s margins are driven by contestation for control of borderland regions and 
longstanding grievances against central state authority (often linked to ethnic, religious and 
linguistic differences). Post-war bargaining therefore revolves around questions of political 
representation and inclusion/exclusion, distribution of resources, and access to services and 
government positions. In many post-war countries there may be a level of stability and 
settlement at the centre alongside ongoing conflict and ‘unsettlement’ in borderland regions. 
For instance in Nepal in 2006, as discussed elsewhere in this publication [ADD XXXX], there 
appeared to be a broad and inclusive settlement forged in Kathmandu, but this was not 
accepted in parts of the Tarai – the southern plains region bordering India, where two-thirds 
of the population identify as ‘Madhesi’ – leading to violent contestation.  
There is a need to bring analytical frameworks that focus on power, institutions and 
resources more explicitly into conversation with approaches that deal with space, place and 
territory. Taking the state margins as the starting point from which to understand processes 
of state contestation, fragility and development addresses a number of key weaknesses in 
how PSA is being used in peacebuilding policy and development interventions by:  
 
(1) clarifying the drivers and dynamics of borderland violence;  
(2) providing tools to analyse the agents and dynamics of change in borderland regions;  
(3) emphasising the importance of the ideas and beliefs of borderland communities to the 
dynamics of war-to-peace transitions. 
 
We go into greater detail of how these operate below. 
 
(1) Analysing borderland violence 
PSA adopts a reductionist view of violence, viewing it as a tool used instrumentally by actors 
(invariably elites) to re-shape or protect political settlements. This framework does not 
capture the varied causes and functions of violence in conflict-affect countries, how violence 
is mobilised and constrained by traditions, beliefs, norms and ideologies, or the ways in 
which it can remain central to the post-war order even after a political settlement has 
stabilised. As outlined above, a state-centric PSA framework assumes that elite agreement 
at the centre creates the foundations for re-establishing order in unruly borderlands – 
overlooking why borderlands can become important sites of contestation, and the specific 
challenges they pose for stabilising violent conflict. 
 
In order to better conceptualise the varied causes and functions of borderland violence, we 
draw on research by Cheng, Goodhand and Meehan to distinguish between three broad 
types of violence: competitive, embedded and permissive violence:iii 
 
• Competitive violence occurs between warring elites to contest the distribution of power in 
society, and is the kind of violence prioritised in PSA.  
 
• Embedded violence is entrenched in how a political settlement works. The privileges 
elites gain by committing to a political settlement are not only economic (e.g. control over 
certain resources, import licences) or political (government positions) but also include the 
‘right’ to use violence. These ‘violence rights’ determine who has the ‘right’ to enact 
violence, upon whom, for what reasons, and with what level of impunity. Embedded 
violence can have distinctly gendered dynamics and in many conflicts – notably El 
Salvador and Guatemala – wartime strategies of gender and sexual violence became 
embedded in the peacetime tactics deployed by security forces to enforce deeply 
inequitable forms of post-war order.  
 
• Permissive violence relates to activities, such as forms of criminal violence, that occur in 
areas where the state lacks a monopoly of violence, but which neither challenge the 
political settlement nor become embedded in how it works. 
 
None of these forms of violence are unique to borderlands, although they may be distinct in 
such regions. Addressing forms of competitive violence can be especially challenging in 
borderlands since these regions are often central to processes of statebuilding and 
economic development and zones where state authority is heavily contested. Borderlands 
are often also valuable sites of cross-border trade, especially where different systems of 
regulation and commodity valuation heighten the exchange value of goods on different sides 
of the border, and make cross-border trade especially profitable. This can heighten 
competition for control over cross-border networks and flows, especially in countries such as 
Myanmar where border regions are themselves the site of lucrative resources.  
 
Borderland regions also provide practical advantages for those challenging state authority. 
Cross-border spaces can offer protection from government attacks, either through 
arrangement with neighbouring governments or with other armed groups operating in the 
margins of neighbouring states. The supposed inviolability of international borders limits 
state authorities’ efforts to curb activities beyond their boundaries. Attempts by governments 
to co-opt borderland elites may be particularly difficult in contexts where borderland elites 
are able to access cross-border support systems, strengthening their autonomy and 
negotiating power. For example, in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, central governments have 
struggled to co-opt borderland elites whose power is derived from their control over illicit 
cross-border economies. 
 
Forms of embedded violence can be particularly pronounced in contested borderlands 
where government attempts to gain control are reliant on coercion and violence, and lead to 
suspending rather than extending the rule of law. Such responses often create forms of 
protracted cyclical violence. In Colombia and Myanmar, attempts by central governments to 
extend authority rely on alliances with paramilitary-style organisations. In these contexts, 
stability is less about bringing an end to violence than franchising out violence to secure 
control over contested territories. In some cases, stability at the centre may rest on 
agreements that tolerate or even exacerbate violence in borderland regions. In Myanmar, 
the rampant extraction of and exploitation of resources – especially timber, jade, drugs and 
land – in the country’s borderlands underpins the political settlement that has emerged. 
Bargains between military elites, national and transnational business elites, and in some 
cases leaders of non-state armed groups, have stabilised armed conflict in many areas but 
have subjected borderland populations to violent dispossession of land, environmental 
destruction and the negative consequences of illegal drugs. 
 
Disaggregating forms of borderland violence points to the need for a systemic reappraisal of 
current conflict resolution and peacebuilding policies. In particular, it emphasises the need to 
understand how violence can become an important component of post-war state 
consolidation and economic development, rather than being caused by the absence of the 
state or the economic marginalisation of borderland regions. This warns against the 
assumption that peacebuilding, economic development and the expansion of state authority 
are necessarily mutually reinforcing and emphasises the need to understand the trade-offs 
that often surround these policy goals.  
 
2) Brokerage: agents of change 
PSA tends to be based on a structuralist understanding of political change and development 
and struggles to make sense of the dynamics of change and sources of agency within 
political settlements. Political brokerage provides a lens to understand the shifting dynamics 
of political settlements. Borderland brokers are the go-betweens, gatekeepers or 
representatives that span spatial divides between competing elite coalitions or connect 
political elites to their constituencies. They seek to occupy and monopolise a ‘deal space’ – a 
point of friction and an interface – which links the centre to periphery, the (trans)national to 
the local. The dynamics of brokerage and the nature of the deal space are shaped by three 
key factors: timing, space and scale. 
 
First, the ‘deal space’ is usually extremely time-sensitive. As noted by Bell and Pospisil, 
periods of post-war transition are often characterised by periods of protracted ‘unsettlement’, 
and include moments of rupture when new rules of the game are renegotiated. These 
periods of flux create an opening and a demand for actors that can mediate between 
different levels, spaces and social and institutional boundaries. For example in post-war 
Nepal, Madhesi elites in the Tarai borderland mobilised against the new constitution, making 
demands for more substantive federalism. A new deal space was opened up by a violent 
movement in the Tarai, which was followed by an economic blockade that Madhesi brokers 
were integral to. Conversely, over time, the space for brokerage may close down as new 
power-sharing agreements are forged or the central state establishes a stronger foothold in 
previously ‘unruly’ borderland regions. 
 
Second, brokerage is shaped by the distinct characteristics of each borderland space, 
including the degree and form of institutional and social hybridity. In the post-war period, the 
(re)negotiation of centre–periphery relations shapes formal debates related to constitutional 
change, transitional justice and economic development, as well as the informal bargaining 
linked to the distribution of rents and political positions. This is an uneven and ‘ragged’ 
process – some borderlands are more salient to the central state than others, which means 
that some brokers have greater or lesser significance. Political brokerage therefore differs 
according to the spaces and synapses that brokers occupy.  
 
Apex brokers are from borderlands with high salience. They constitute the spine of a political 
system, linking the centre to core coalitions and constituencies. They have privileged access 
to key figures in the central state, to major on-budget or off-budget resources and to crucial 
sources of information and intelligence. They may have a major role in the use of 
‘competitive violence’ to enforce or renegotiate the terms of the political settlement. 
Nangarhar province in the eastern borderlands of Afghanistan for example, with its powerful 
tribal structures and strategic location on the Pakistan border, has always been home to 
apex brokers who could make and unmake national political settlements. On the other hand, 
tertiary brokers are located either in less salient borderlands or they broker relationships 
within borderland regions, rather than directly with the central state. They facilitate the 
circulation of power, ideas and resources in spaces that do not determine the overall stability 
or otherwise of the national political settlement; here ‘permissive violence’ can feature 
without being a significant concern to ruling elites.  
 
Third, as well as connecting different spaces, brokers operate across and frequently jump 
between different scales. For example, those involved in illicit economies circumvent the 
central state and directly ‘plug in’ to regional and international markets. Gaining access to 
international aid and connections may open up the deal space of borderland brokers vis-à-
vis the state. These brokers are therefore not constrained by the ‘national order of things’ 
and though they may by locally embedded they operate in a regional and international 
environment.  
 
3) Ideas, ideologies, discourses and beliefs  
A further criticism of PSA is its reductionist analysis of elite interests and incentives. Elites 
are assumed to be driven by the pursuit of wealth and power, and political settlements are 
presumed to be the result of conflict and negotiation over material resources. This 
understates the foundational role of traditions, ideologies, beliefs, cultural norms and notions 
of legitimacy. Although none of these issues are unique to borderland regions, they do have 
important spatial dimensions. 
 
Cultural norms and belief systems are inseparable from notions of place, space and territory, 
and frequently border regions are at the nexus of clashing or incommensurate world views 
and belief systems. On the one hand, national identities and state-based discourses about 
citizenship may not resonate with or may be weakest in borderland areas, where the history 
of state authority has been limited and contested. In Myanmar, for example, the ethnic 
minorities who occupy borderland regions, or the Madhesi population in Nepal’s Tarai 
region, have alternative histories, visions and cultural practices that clash with central elites’ 
efforts to forge exclusivist national identities and ideologies of rule. Conversely, forms of 
extreme nationalism and ethnic chauvinism may flourish in the periphery, as for example 
Sinhala nationalism in Sri Lanka, which emerged from the state’s southern periphery, and 
was mirrored in turn by the emergence of Tamil nationalism from the north-east. The 
nationalist political imagination has depended on the constant invocation of border threats 
and dangers to the territorial integrity of the nation. 
 
Borders, as well as being containers of nationalism, are also conduits of transnationalism. 
People, ideas and commodities cross and challenge the border, and ideologies and visions 
of security and development do not stop at international borders. For example, diaspora 
communities may pursue alternative visions of post-war reconstruction that challenge state-
based narratives. On a much larger scale, China’s vision of security and development 
extends well beyond national borders into the borderlands of Myanmar, Laos and beyond. 
In the post-war moment, when the political settlement is being renegotiated and people’s 
understandings of the world around them are in a state of flux, there are heightened 
opportunities for brokers to mediate across competing narratives and fields of meaning – the 
deal space is not only about negotiating rents, but also about ‘translation’ and sense making. 
For example, when the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1994, it drew upon local 
clerics, religious education, shari’a law and rural village culture to mobilise support and draw 
key constituencies in the eastern borderlands into the new political settlement. This is 
illustrative of the fact that mobilising legitimacy (as well as capital and coercion) – particularly 
in strategically important peripheral regions – may be key to establishing stable political 
settlements.  
Similarly, the power of borderlands elites is linked not only to their access to resources and 
the means of coercion, but their ability to represent and vocalise the demands and beliefs of 
borderland populations. This is especially important for understanding inclusion and 
exclusion at the margins of states. PSA concentrates mostly on the importance of ‘horizontal’ 
inclusion – i.e. inclusion of competing elites – to stabilising violent conflict, but it provides 
little scope for analysing the dynamics of ‘vertical inclusion’ – i.e. inclusion of the interests of 
non-elites rather than purely at the level of competing elites.  
Exploring the role of ideas, ideologies and beliefs also draws attention to factors that mitigate 
or exacerbate exclusion at the margins of the state, such as whether borderland elites can 
act independently of the populations they claim to represent, or whether their power is 
conditional upon delivering certain promises or services. For example, in conflict-affected 
borderlands political negotiation, brokerage and ideologies can become hyper-masculinised 
in ways that marginalise women from decision-making and ensure that their interests are not 
an important factor in shaping how elites mobilise support and compete for power. However, 
the need for borderland elites to offer credible alternatives to state authority can also 
heighten the importance of service delivery – such as health, education and justice – as a 
source of legitimacy for borderland elites. This suggests that external peacebuilders need to 
better understand the vernacular of local politics and in particular local understandings of 
legitimacy.  
Gendering conflicted borderlands* 
Borderlands, particularly those affected by conflict, are sites of contestation but also 
constant negotiation. Maintaining, containing and securing borderlands may benefit some 
constituencies to the detriment of others, and produce violence, some forms of which may 
be less visible or more disguised than others. A gendered borderlands lens focuses 
attention on specific identities (masculinities, femininities, sexuality, race and class), and 
how these intersect to shape processes of inclusion and exclusion. It is also a tool for 
understanding how borders and associated structures and institutions in borderlands are 
used to maintain power and gendered inequalities. 
 
Therefore, ‘gendering borderlands’ helps increase understanding of the distinct 
relationships that diverse social groups have to the border, as well as the kinds of 
movement the border enables – or disables. It raises important questions about who has 
control over the border – who has access to movement, and who is contained and 
imprisoned by it. It also looks at how and why certain groups – such as rural women and 
men, ethnic minorities and young people – and power relations are left out of national 
development and peacebuilding processes in borderlands. A gender perspective 
highlights the fact that ‘the international borderline’ is only one component of a network of 
borders and boundaries. Gendering borderlands reveals the multiple physical, virtual, 
legal, personal and political boundaries that diverse groups and individuals experience 
and negotiate as part of their lives on the margins. 
 
A gendered borderlands lens also highlights resistance – it explicitly contends with how 
those excluded at the margins resist agents and systems of domination, and the spaces 
that open up to transform systems that perpetuate the exclusion of particular groups. 
 
*Dr Mandy Sadan, (Reader in the History of South East Asia, SOAS) also contributed to 
this box 
 
 
Conclusion 
PSA has helped develop a more rigorous political economy analysis of the drivers of violent 
conflict and the trajectories of post-war transitions. However, the nation-state spatial 
framework that underpins PSA has limited the insights it can provide on borderland violence 
and post-war transitions. Addressing this analytical gap involves thinking about the 
interconnections between power, space and time – which do not generate a simple set of 
policy prescriptions. To some extent it reinforces what is already known to be good practice 
– taking context and history seriously, and understanding power relations. And perhaps its 
chief value to policymakers is to provide another analytical lens – along with several others, 
including gender, conflict and the environment – that can be deployed in contexts where 
borderland dynamics are a significant factor. This should lead to more targeted, contextually 
attuned policies, which are cognisant of processes on both sides of the border. 
 
A borderland perspective leads to a set of questions with valuable implications for 
international peacebuilding practice:  
 
To what extent do formal structures and institutional arrangements align with existing 
configurations of power? A borderland perspective focuses explicitly on the spatialisation 
of power and how political settlements have subnational and transnational dimensions. 
Although international actors have neither the capacity nor the legitimacy to micro-manage 
political settlements or empower borderland elites, they do need to better appreciate 
underlying power relations and their spatial dynamics and the vernacular and idioms of local 
politics. Interventions can perhaps create the conditions for more productive ‘conversations’ 
between states and borderlands – or at the very least not create disincentives for such 
conversations to take place.  
 
How do brokers influence the relationship between centres and borderlands? And 
how can brokerage arrangements promote security and, in the long-term, support 
more progressive and inclusive post-war orders? Engaging with this question does not 
mean fixating on finding ‘good’ brokers to support while avoiding ‘bad’ brokers. Rather, it 
should be based on an understanding of the environments brokers work in. This provides a 
starting point to explore how interventions can influence the incentive structures of brokers to 
reduce the use of violence as a negotiating tool and how service delivery – including to 
marginalised groups – can become a more important foundation for power and legitimacy.  
 
What are the trade-offs between different sets of policy goals and interventions? A 
borderland perspective calls into question several mainstream assumptions, including ideas 
that: statebuilding and peacebuilding are synonymous with each other; extending the state 
footprint into borderlands will bring peace and stability; economic integration will reduce 
insecurity and poverty in border regions; or promoting good governance will help stabilise 
borderlands. There is therefore a need for more conscious deliberation on the trade-offs 
between different goals, and who bears the costs of various interventions. 
 
Is borderland insecurity generated by policy regimes and decision making in 
metropolitan centres? A borderland perspective exposes the links between insecurity and 
poverty in borderland regions, and stability and prosperity in metropolitan centres. Therefore 
the ‘pathologies’ of the margins are generated by – and need to be addressed by – policy 
regimes and initiatives emanating from the centre.  
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